Blocks an agent installing a package from an unapproved registry or adding a dependency with no lockfile entry.
For: Teams worried about agent-introduced supply-chain risk
Blocks installs pointed at a registry outside the approved list.
Blocks machine-wide (`-g`) installs — the agent stays inside the project.
Escalates a new dependency added without a resolved lockfile entry.
# Cursor Dependency-Install Whitelist
# Fork: replace approved_registries with your own mirror / proxy.
apiVersion: decionis.dev/v1
kind: PolicyPack
metadata:
name: cursor-dependency-install-whitelist
surface: cursor
standards: [SOC2-CC7.1, ISO27001-A.8.9]
defaults:
mode: shadow
emit_dossier: true
fail_closed: true
approved_registries:
- "https://registry.npmjs.org"
- "https://pypi.org/simple"
rules:
- name: registry_whitelist
when: "tool == 'Bash' AND command matches '(npm|pnpm|yarn|pip) (install|add)'"
decision: |
BLOCK IF resolved_registry not in approved_registries
ALLOW OTHERWISE
reason_code: registry_not_approved
- name: global_install_block
when: "tool == 'Bash' AND command matches '(npm|pnpm|yarn) (install|add)'"
decision: |
BLOCK IF command matches '(\s-g\b|--global)'
ALLOW OTHERWISE
reason_code: global_install_blocked
- name: unpinned_dependency
when: "change.kind == 'dependency_add'"
decision: |
ESCALATE IF lockfile.entry_present == false
ALLOW OTHERWISE
reason_code: dependency_not_pinned
Fork it, change the thresholds to match your environment, and deploy in shadow mode first — it defaults to listen-only so nothing in your live pipeline changes.
Follow the install path for this surface, then paste the forked YAML as your policy config.
This recipe is one step in a path. The same five steps apply to every recipe in the exchange.
Run the policy against a realistic action in the browser. Push it past what the rules allow and watch the verdict come back. No account.
See exactly what was decided and why: the rule that fired, the evidence it read, the policy version in force, and an Ed25519 signature you can verify yourself.
Measure what the policy would have caught on your own traffic without touching the live path. Every recipe defaults to shadow, so the first deployment carries no execution risk.
Point the same policy at the system where the action actually originates — a checkout, an ERP posting, a Zap, an agent's tool call.
Publish the proof: a public verification link, an embeddable badge, a PR comment, or an anonymized shadow-mode finding. This is how the next person discovers Decionis.